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We examine capital structure changes to investigate the impact of SFAS No. 13 on lessees. While 
this accounting standard essentially rearranged capital lease disclosures (from footnotes to the 
balance sheet), mandated capitalization substantially altered key accounting ratios. Our results 
document a systematic substitution from capital leases to operating leases and nonlease sources of 
financing. In addition, lessees appear to reduce book leverage by increasing equity and reducing 
conventional debt. The magnitudes of these responses are cross-sectionally related to preadoption 
levels of footnoted capital leases. 
1. Introduction 
This paper documents a significant change in the capital structure of lessee 
firms in response to Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 
13, ‘Accounting for Leases’ [FASB (1976)]. Before the accounting rule change, 
most leases that were effectively purchases of assets (hereafter ‘capital leases’) 
were reported in footnotes to the financial statements.’ SFAS No. 13 changed 
the form of capital lease disclosures by requiring all capital leases to be 
reported as assets and debt - effectively moving capital leases from the 
footnotes to the balance sheet. Lease capitalization was expected to increase 
*The authors acknowledge Krishna Pale&s (the referee) helpful suggestions along with 
comments from Ray Ball, \Tic Bernard, Linda DeAngelo, Harry DeAngel:; Robert Lipey Greg 
Niehaus. Patricia O’Brien. Jav Ritter, Jav Shanken, Dennis Sheehan. Cliff Smith, Ross Watts, 
Jerry Zimmerman, and workshop participants at Michigan State University, University of 
Colorado at Boulder, and University of Notre-Dame. 
‘Prior to SFAS No. 13, firms had the option of reporting capital leases either in the footnotes or 
in the body of the financial statements. Most lessees, especially firms with relatively large amounts 
of capital leases, elected footnote disclosure for their capital leases. Technically, these off-balance 
sheet capital leases are termed ‘financing’ leases, under ASR No. 147 [SEC (1973)]. Here we 
ignore this distinction and refer to all leases that are essentially purchases of assets as capital 
leases. 
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book leverage ratios and reduce accounting rates of return. Based on contract- 
ing-costs arguments [summarized in Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) and 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986)], we hypothesize that financial statement changes 
caused by the standard increased the cost of using capital leases, thereby 
causing lessees to reduce the proportion of assets financed through capital 
leases. 
The most pervasive effect we observe is substitution from capital leases to 
operating leases (all leases not classified as capital leases).* Firms employing 
relatively larger amounts of capital leases reported substantial declines in 
capital leases and corresponding increases in operating leases around adoption 
of the standard. We also find substitution towards nonlease financing, indi- 
cated by a decline in total leasing (operating and capital combined). Finally, 
the standard is associated with leverage-reducing changes within nonlease 
sources of financing, evidenced by increases in equity and decreases in 
conventional long-term debt. The magnitude of these capital structure changes, 
which offset the expected financial statement impact of the standard, are 
cross-sectionally related to preadoption levels of footnoted capital leases. 
We examine the lease accounting rule change because it had a major impact 
on lessees’ financial statements. Balance sheet debt is expected to double for 
our sample of lessees with relatively higher preadoption levels of footnoted 
capital leases.3 The existence of prepronouncement ‘as-if capitalized’ footnote 
disclosures enables us to predict the standard’s impact on lessees’ financial 
statements, thereby allowing cross-sectional analyses. Footnote disclosures 
also identify cash flows for capital and operating leases both before and after 
the change, thereby allowing estimation of firm responses to the standard 
along a number of dimensions. 
The regression methodology employed here uses control periods from before 
and after the new standard to identify unexpected capital structure changes 
associated with the rule change. This procedure controls for two statistical 
problems that potentially bias inferences based on analyses of financial 
statement variables: heteroskedasticity and regression to the mean. To provide 
additional control for confounding effects, we analyze a well-defined subsam- 
ple of lessees. We also offer a nonparametric analysis that is used to comple- 
ment the regression results. Unlike earlier studies that analyze only one 
‘All long-term leases that are not effectively purchases of assets are classified as operating leases. 
(Short-term leases and rental contracts are excluded from the analysis.) While the distinction 
between capital and operating leases is assumed to be dichotomous, the degree to which 
ownership rights and risks can be transferred to lessees is clearly a continuous variable. Here we 
use the accounting definitions of capital and operating leases to represent two groups of leases 
that transfer relatively more and relatively less ownership rights to the lessee, respectively. 
‘Other factors supporting the perceived importance of this standard include the number of 
comment letters received by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) concerning SFAS 
No. 13, during its development, and the fact that the FASB has issued thirteen subsequent 
pronouncements related to leases. 
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response variable (discussed in section 4.1) we analyze potential responses 
along many dimensions. Our results demonstrate the importance of consider- 
ing alternative responses that firms affected by a new standard might use to 
offset the financial statement effects of the rule change. 
Section 2 of this paper develops the research hypothesis. Section 3 reports 
results of empirical tests, and section 4 discusses the methodology employed 
and provides a summary of the results and their implications. 
2. Research hypothesis 
Fig. 1 describes the lease disclosure environment before and after SFAS No. 
13. The notation introduced in fig. 1 and used throughout the paper identifies 
the net present values (PV) of capital lease obligations reported in footnotes 
(PVC@,) and balance sheets (PVCAP,), as well as minimum scheduled cash 
flows (FL) for both capital leases (FLCAP) and operating leases (FLOP). 
While some leases were capitalized (‘booked’) as assets and debt prior to the 
standard, most capital leases were reported in footnotes in accordance with 
existing accounting rules [AICPA (1964, 1973) SEC (1973)]. After the stan- 
dard, the present values of preadoption capital lease obligations reported in 
footnotes are required to be capitalized retroactively as debt and the corre- 
sponding unamortized asset values included as assets. Because of differences in 
the timing of expenses for capital and operating leases, owners’ equity is 
expected to decline after capitalization and net income is expected to decrease 
for most lessees (with increasing nominal amounts of capital leases) [El-Gazzar 
et al. (1986)].4 
The financial statement impact of lease capitalization and the consequences 
expected by managers of affected firms are well documented elsewhere 
[Abdel-kbalik (1981)]. Increases in debt and assets combine with decreases in 
equity and income to cause expected increases in accounting measures of 
leverage and decreases in accounting rates of return. Managers specifically 
mentioned debt covenant violations as a problem caused by increased account- 
ing leverage ratios [FASB (1976)]. Also accounting rates of return are fre- 
quently used either explicitly as a measure of managerial performance in 
compensation contracts [Healy (1985)] or implicitly by compensation commit- 
tees in setting overall compensation [Antle and Smith (1986)]. Managers of 
lessee firms with debt contracts, managerial compensation agreements, or 
other contracts affected by SFAS No. 13 had economic incentives to offset the 
4Unlike the uniform balance sheet effect of the standard, lease capitalization can either increase 
or decrease income. Relative to operating leases, expenses are higher (lower) for capital leases 
early (late) in the lease life. However, examination of preadoption footnote data that disclosed 
‘as-if-capitalized’ information, for a subsample of lessees described in the appendix, uncovered no 
income-increasing firms and indicated a high cross-sectional correlation between increases in 
leverage and percent decreases in income. 
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Lease disclosures available before and after SFAS No. 13l 
PANEL k Present values of all future lease payments (STOCK@ 
lXPE~FLL4S.E 





1) Booked as asset/liability 
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2) Off-Balance Sheet 
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Booked as asset/liability 
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d for operating leases 
PANEL R: Next five year’s lease payments(FLOWS)2 
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1) Booked as asset/liability 
FLCAP, 
(not reported) 





POST SFAS NO. 13 
Booked as asset/liability 
IFLCAP,I 
Summary notation used to present lease di.~closures is as follows. The fust two letters. PV and FL, represent present values 
(in panel A) and cash flows (in panel B). respectively. The remaining letters (CAP or OP) represent capital and operating 
leases, respectively. The subscripts b and f indicate that present values for capital leases are repotted in the balance sheet and 
footnotes. respectively. 
Only boxed items were disclosed in Annual Reports. In Panel B, FLCAPb was not reported and FLCAPf and FLOP were 
reported as a combined amount in the pre SFAS No. 13 period. To obtain separate values for flows in this period. an average 
ratio FLCAPE’VCAP is computed for each fii in the post SFAS No. I3 period. This ratio is multiplied by PVCAPt, and 
PVCAPf. for each fib-m. to impute FLCAb and FLCAPf for the pre SFAS No. 13 period. FLOP is estimated by 
subtracting the imputed value of FLCAPf from the total for FLOP and FLCAPf reported in the pre SFAS No. I3 period. 
Most capital leases in the pre SFAS No.13 period were not booked as assels and liabilities on the balance shea Instead they 
were labelled “financing” leases and fwmote disclosures reported the financial statement effects that would have occurred if 
these leases bad been booked as assets and liabilities. After SFAS No. 13, all capital leases are booked on the balance sheet. 
Fig. 1 
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financial statement effects of lease capitalization. While stockholders and 
managers are the parties adversely affected by the standard and managers are 
expected to determine appropriate responses, for expositional purposes we 
refer to the firm (or the lessee) as the party being affected by and determining 
responses to the standard. 
Each firm’s response to the standard depends on factors such as the cost of 
violating debt contract restrictions, the way accounting-based restrictions are 
stated and measured, and the upper and lower limits in compensation arrange- 
ments. Potential responses include 1) renegotiating parameters of contracts 
affected by lease capitalization, 2) violating debt covenants and entering into 
technical default, and 3) mitigating the financial statement impact of lease 
capitalization by undertaking offsetting capital structure changes. This last 
response includes a host of capital structure changes representing substitution 
from capital leases and conventional debt into equity and other forms of 
off-balance sheet financing (including operating leases). In general, the specific 
response (or mix of responses) selected by each lessee is determined by the 
relative costs and benefits of alternative responses, and magnitudes of firm 
responses are determined by factors such as the magnitude of the standard’s 
impact on relevant accounting ratios and the amount of preadoption ‘slack’ 
relative to limits specified in affected contracts. 
Our research strategy is to examine actual lessee responses to the standard 
to provide evidence on the relative costs and benefits of alternative responses. 
Additional confirmation that the responses observed are a consequence of the 
standard is provided by examining the cross-sectional relation between 
the magnitudes of firm responses and the expected impact of the standard. In 
the absence of data on relevant parameters of affected contracts, preadoption 
levels of footnoted capital leases (PVCH’, reported immediately prior to the 
standard) are assumed to proxy for the expected impact of the standard.5 In 
effect, we assume that cross-sectional variation along omitted contractual 
variables (such as limits specified in debt contracts and preadoption ‘slack’ 
relative to these limits) is random, or at least sufficiently unrelated to the proxy 
used to allow statistically significant relations to be observed. To enable 
comparisons across lessees, PVCAP, is deflated by long-term capitalization 
(LTC), which equals the book value of long-term conventional debt and 
equity plus the present values of all capital lease obligations (PVCAP, + 
PVCAP,). The same ratio was employed by the SEC (1973) to measure the 
5Ekamination of footnote data indicates that, while the expected liability increase due to lease 
capitalization (PVCAP,) is correlated with expected asset increases, equity decreases, and income 
reductions across lessees, the dollar value of this liability effect differs slightly from the asset and 
equity effects and varies substantially from the income effect (see footnote 4). We assume that the 
liability-based proxy used here is cross-sectionally related to expected changes in accounting 
measures of leverage and rates of return, despite the fact that these accounting measures are based 
on financial statement items that include both liability and nonliability accounts. 
282 E. Imhof and .I. Thomas, Lease disclosure consequences 
extent to which firms employ footnoted capital leases. Despite potential 
measurement error, we believe this proxy for the expected impact of the 
standard is the best available, and it is used as the explanatory variable for all 
empirical tests. 
In summary, the research hypothesis is motivated by the effects of lease 
capitalization on key accounting ratios used explicitly and implicitly in lending 
and compensation contracts. Cross-sectionally, the hypothesis predicts that 
lessees with larger amounts of preadoption footnoted capital leases, scaled by 
long-term capitalization, are relatively more active in their efforts to offset 
financial statement changes caused by the standard. In contrast, the null 
hypothesis (of no economic consequences) predicts that lessees mechanically 
apply the new lease disclosure rules by booking all capital leases previously 
reported in the footnotes. 
3. Empirical tests and results 
To test the null hypothesis, we identify unexpected capital structure changes 
based on available financial disclosures. We first examine the cross-sectional 
relation between unexpected changes in capital leases around SFAS No. 13 
and preadoption levels of footnoted capital leases for all Compustat firms 
reporting leases. We then examine the same relation for a subsample of 158 
firms, to address certain limitations of the Compustat sample results. Since 
reducing capital leases represents only one of many possible responses to the 
standard, we also examine four other measurable responses for this subsam- 
ple: changes in operating leases, changes in overall leasing, changes in conven- 
tional (nonlease) debt, and changes in equity.6 
3.1. Changes in capital leases - Compustat sample 
If lessees affected by SFAS No. 13 seek to reduce capital leases, the research 
hypothesis predicts an unexpected decline in reported capital leases, subse- 
quent to the adoption of SFAS No. 13, that is positively related to preadop- 
tion levels of footnoted capital leases. This simple statement of the hypothesis 
requires adjustment to incorporate several institutional details. 
The standard allowed for a lengthy transition period that varied across 
firms. Annual reports for years ending on or before December 1976 disclosed 
leases under the old rules. Annual reports for years ending on or after 
December 1978 were expected to have completed retroactive adoption of the 
60nly a subset of the many responses observed are analyzed in depth, since analysis of all 
potential responses for all lessees is prohibitively expensive (see section 4.2). 
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standard for all capital leases. ’ Thus, the time between the last report in the 
preadoption period and the first report in the postadoption period is two years 
for calendar-year-end firms and three years for all other firms. Moreover some 
lessees adopted the standard early (typically firms with relatively low amounts 
of capital leases), while a few others delayed capitalization beyond the 1978 
deadline to settle contractual violations caused by adoption of the standard 
[Pfeiffer (1980)]. 
To avoid reading individual annual reports to identify firm-specific transi- 
tion periods, we assume a uniform two-year transition period for all lessees on 
Compustat. The first year in the postadoption period (called 1978) consists of 
firm-years with year-ends between December 1978 and November 1979. Simi- 
larly, we treat firm-years with year-ends between December 1976 and Novem- 
ber 1977 as the last year in the preadoption period and label this year as 1976. 
All subsequent tests conducted on a subsample of 158 lessees (described in the 
appendix) use firm-specific transition periods and years are classified as 
defined by Compustat. While the two-year transition period assumed here 
causes potential measurement errors, the actual transition period for 128 of 
158 firms in the subsample (81 percent) was included within this two-year 
period. Using an approximate transition period causes underestimation of 
lessee responses, thereby biasing tests on the Compustat sample in favor of the 
null hypothesis.8 
In addition to the complexity regarding transition periods, SFAS No. 13 
altered the definition of capital leases to include some leases previously 
classified as operating leases and also redefined the discount rate used to 
compute present values of lease obligations. 9 These changes result in a small 
but indeterminable upward bias in postadoption present values for capital 
leases, relative to expectations based on preadoption levels of capital leases. 
71nitially the FASB allowed a five-year grace period, to 1981, before retroactive capitalization 
was required. This concession was in response to lessee complaints that capitalization would cause 
them to violate extant contractual agreements. The SEC intervened with ASR 225 [SEC (1977)] 
and reduced this period to two years. However, the SEC allowed firms to delay capitalization if 
more time was needed to settle contractual violations caused by adoption of the new standard, 
provided reasons for the delay were disclosed. 
“Since lessees were aware of the proposed standard prior to 1976, firm responses could precede 
the two-year transition period considered here. However, a three-year transition period starting in 
1975 is not used since lease data is available only after 1973. The data required for a three-year 
preadoption control period (introduced later) would not be available. 
‘Under ASR 147 [SEC(1973)], leases had to be both noncancellable and their term exceed 75 
percent of the economic life of the asset to qualify as ‘capital’ leases (more correctly, financing 
leases). Under SFAS No. 13, however, even cancellable leases can be classified as capital leases. 
Also, leases meeting any one of four conditions, including the 75 percent of economic life 
criterion, are classified as capital leases. Under ASR 147, the relevant discount rate was the 
interest rate implicit in the lease payments. Under SFAS No. 13, the relevant discount rate is 
the lower of the implicit rate and the ‘incremental’ borrowing rate of the lessee (defined as the rate 
the lessee would have to pay to borrow funds at lease inception to purchase the leased asset). This 
potential reduction in discount rates implies higher present values. 
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Again, not accounting for this change in definitions biases statistical tests 
against observing a decreasing in capital leases as predicted by the research 
hypothesis. 
To incorporate the two-year transition period and underestimation of ex- 
pected postadoption values of PVCM’, the null and research (alternate) 
hypotheses are stated in terms of the following cross-sectional model: 
= y + 6( PVCAPf/LTC),,,, + 3, 
Ha: y>O, 6=0, H,: y>O, 6~0, 
0) 
where 
PVCAP = present value of future lease commitments for all capital leases, 
A = book value of nonlease assets, 
PVCAP, = present value of future lease commitments for capital leases re- 
ported in footnotes, 
LTC = long-term capitalization equals PVCAP, plus book value of debt 
and equity, and 
EL .I = expected value, based on preadoption levels of capital leases. 
Since specifications of the independent and dependent variables and their 
exact functional relation is hampered by lack of theory, we make certain 
choices to allow empirical tests. In addition to assumptions made in section 2 
regarding the explanatory variable, we assume that unexpected changes in 
capital leases, representing the dependent variable, are linearly related to the 
explanatory variable. Present values for capital leases (PVCAP) are scaled by 
the book value of nonlease assets (A) to control for changes in firm size and 
inflation during the lengthy transition period.” Extensive sensitivity analyses 
summarized later reveal that our results are not driven by these choices. Given 
that expected postadoption values of capital leases, based on preadoption 
levels, are potentially downward biased (due to the definitional changes per 
SFAS No. 13) the intercept (y) is expected to be positive under both 
hypotheses. Note that both the null and alternative hypotheses predict zero 
values for the intercept if expectations are correctly specified. Any bias due to 
the definitional change is assumed to be entirely captured by the intercept.” 
“Assets financed through capital leases are specifically excluded from the measure used to 
deflate P VCA P to avoid any bias caused by a decline in capital leases in the postadoption period 
as predicted by the alternate hypothesis. LTC, the deflator used for the explanatory variable, is 
not used as a deflator for PVCAP for the same reason. 
“If, however, the underestimation of postadoption values is positively related to preadoption 
levels of footnoted capital leases, then estimates for 6 will be biased towards zero. 
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For notational simplicity, we drop firm subscripts (subscript i for the ith firm) 
used to signify that individual firms are being analyzed in a cross-section 
regression. 
To identify firm responses in the absence of a theory predicting levels of 
capital leases, we could assume that observed changes in capital leases equal 
unexpected changes during the transition period (a random walk expectation 
model). ‘* However, if hig h lease - firms normally reduce leasing and low-lease 
firms normally increase leasing, a cross-sectional mean-reverting relation would 
exist between levels and changes in levels of capital leases.13 Since preadoption 
levels of capital leases, (PVUP/A),,,,, are highly correlated empirically with 
the independent variable specified in eq. (l), (PI/cAP,/LTC),,,,, the null 
hypothesis would be incorrectly rejected in this case. To provide an expecta- 
tion model that controls for reversion towards a cross-sectional mean, the 
following relation is estimated over three two-year periods extending from 
1974 to 1980: 
(PVCAP/A),- (PI/‘CAP/A),~,=ar+P(PVc~P/A),~*+q,. (2) 
This cross-sectional relation (firm subscripts dropped for convenience) pools 
observations for each firm from the transition period and two adjacent control 
periods defined as follows: 
P, = a preadoption control period, t = 1976, 
P2 = the transition period, t = 1978, and 
P3 = a postadoption control period, t = 1980. 
The presence of reversion towards a cross-sectional mean is indicated by 
estimated values of the intercept (a) and slope (/3) that are greater than and 
less than zero, respectively. If the slope is not different from zero, the 
expectation model reduces to a random walk model (with the intercept 
representing the drift term). In either case, the residuals obtained from this 
regression measure unexpected changes in capital leases. 
Combining eqs. (1) and (2) provides a convenient single-stage regression 
that simultaneously estimates the expectation model and also tests the null 
“Smith and Wakeman (1985) summarize the literature on the determinants of leasing. Current 
theory has not developed sufficiently to suggest a model, that predicts the (optimal) quantity of 
leasing that firms employ. Also, since useful preadoption disclosures for capital leases originated 
in 1973, after ASR 147, there is insufficient data to fit firm-specific time-series models. However, 
the random walk model provides excellent predictions of PVC.4 P/A for individual years during 
the preadoption period ( R2 values in excess of 0.95). 
r3This form of mean reversion is different from regression towards firm-specific time-series 
means. See Freedman, Pisani, and Purvis (1978) for additional details. 
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hypothesis as follows: 
r,= (PVCAP/A),- (PVCAP/A),_, 
= (Y + p(PvcAP/A),_, 
+D{y+G(PvcApf/LTc),,,,} f&t, 
Ha: 6=0, H,: 6~0, 
(3) 
where 
Y = two-year change in PVCAP/A, from year t - 2 to t, 
PVCAP = present value of all future lease payments on all capital leases, 
A = book value of all nonlease assets, 
PVCAP, = present value of all future lease payments for capital leases re- 
ported in footnotes, 
LTC = long-term capitalization = PVCAP, plus book value of long-term 
debt and equity, and 
D = 1 if t = 1978 (transition period, P2) and 
= 0 if t = 1976 (preadoption period, PI) or t = 1980 (postadoption 
period, P3). 
Note that the first right-hand-side variable uses observations from all three 
periods to estimate the expectation model in eq. (2). Transition period residu- 
als, representing unexpected changes in capital leases, are then used to 
measure the cross-sectional relation of interest, expressed in eq. (1). This is 
done by activating the second right-hand-side variable in eq. (3) through the 
dummy variable, only for observations from the transition period.14 Since both 
the null and alternate hypotheses predict positive values for y, it is deleted 
from the hypothesis specification. 
A sample obtained from the 1980 edition of the Annual Industrial Compu- 
stat tape is used to estimate eq. (3). Firms are included in the three periods if 
1) positive values are reported in year t for either capital or operating leases 
and 2) the data necessary for estimating eq. (3) are available on the tape. 
Results obtained using the White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity are 
t4The high correlation during 1976 between the two right-hand-side variables in eq. (3) might 
suggest that the expectation model in eq. (2) should be estimated over the control periods only 
(excluding the transition period) to avoid biasing the expectation model and reducing the 
likelihood of detecting the hypothesized [eq. (l)] effect. Note, however, that this dilution of 
the hypothesized effect is only a problem when eqs. (1) and (2) are estimated separately, since the 
combined single-stage regression in eq. (3) estimates only the incremental effects of each explana- 
tory variable on the dependent variable. A benefit of estimating the expectation model over all 
three periods, rather than the control periods alone, is that the number of observations used to 
estimate the expectation model increases by approximately 50 percent. 
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Table 1 
Analysis of changes in capital leases around adoption of SFAS No. 13 - Compustat sample.a 
Panel A : Regression analysis of changes in capital leases 
x=(PVCAP/A),- (PI/CAP/A),_, 
=~+~I(PVCAP/A),_~+D{~+S(PVCAP,/LTC),,,,} +E, 
a P Y 6 
Estimate 0.0017 - 0.11 0.021 - 0.55 
t-statisticb 0.49 - 1.94 4.47 - 7.07 
p-value’ 0.062 0.05 0.00 0.00 
n = 1987 R2 = 0.32 
Y = two-year change in P VCA P/A 
P VCA P = present value of all future lease payments on all capital leases 
A = book value of all nonlease assets 
PVCA Pr = present value of all future lease payments on capital leases reported in footnotes 
LTC = long-term capitalization = book value of long-term debt and equity plus PVCA P, 
D = 1 if t = 1978 (transition period, P2) and 
= 0 if t = 1976 (preadoption period, P1) or if t = 1980 (postadoption period, 5) 




Two-year change periods Totals 
(PVCAP/A),d (PVCAP/A),_, 
Pi p2 p3 
1974-1976 1976-1978 1978-1980 N Percent 
1 =o =o 165 83 63 311 (16%) 
2 =o 20 22 18 17 3 > = 0 36 7 8 57 I:;; 122 0 
4 >o >o 520 474 503 - 1497 (75%) 
Totals 743 653 591 1987 (100%) 
a While SFAS No. 13 was enacted in 1976, most firms adopted the standard in 1978. Therefore 
changes in capital leases during this two-year transition period ( P2) are compared with changes 
over similar two-year periods during preadoption (P,) and postadoption ( P3) periods to determine 
an effect of SFAS No. 13. 
bt-statistics have been computed based on White (1980) to correct for heteroskedastic error 
terms. 
‘p-value for 6 is based on a one-tailed test. All other p-values refer to two-tailed tests. 
*End-of-period value. 
‘Beginning-of-period value. 
reported in table 1, panel A. l5 The highly significant negative t-statistic on 8 
indicates rejection of the null hypothesis and is consistent with the alternate 
“Error terms are heteroskedastic - both cross-sectionally and over time. The dispersion in error 
terms increases with both right-hand-side variables and is higher in P2 than it is in the two control 
periods. While the parameter estimates are unbiased in this case, the standard errors are biased 
[Kmenta (1971, p. 256)]. The regression procedure PROC REG when used with the ACOV option 
estimates a heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix for parameter estimates 
suggested by White (1980) [see SAS (1986)]. It also recomputes the F-tests provided with the 
TEST statement and reports a x2-test (based on asymptotic estimates) and 
consistent variance-covariance matrix. All t-statistics reported equal 
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hypothesis. l6 Assuming as a first-order approximation that the two scaling 
variables, LTC and A, equal each other, the magnitude of S can be interpre- 
ted as a 55 percent marginal decline in reported capital leases; i.e., at the 
margin, only 45 percent of footnoted capital leases were booked after the 
standard.” The positive value of y = 0.02 can be interpreted as follows: firms 
with no footnoted capital leases in 1976 exhibit an increase in capital leases 
equal to two percent of their nonlease assets. Presumably this increase is due 
to the more stringent definitions after SFAS No. 13. 
These results indicate considerable cross-sectional variation in firm re- 
sponses. While firms with relatively low amounts of footnoted leases report 
unexpected increases in capital leases, firms with larger amounts of footnoted 
capital leases report unexpected declines in capital leases. Also this decline, as 
a percent of preadoption levels of capital leases, is larger for firms with larger 
amounts of footnoted capital leases. Estimates obtained for (Y and p indicate 
that the data display some regression to the mean, since p is significantly 
negative at the five percent level. 
We observe clustering of prediction errors caused by lessees reporting no 
capital leases in either year t or t - 2. This violates the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression model’s assumption of normally distributed error terms.ls 
Table 1, panel B reports the numbers of firms in each of four possible 
categories (labelled types 1 through 4) depending on whether the amounts of 
capital leases in years r and f - 2 are equal to or greater than zero. Observa- 
tions of types 1, 2, and 3 form the clusters that violate the normality 
assumption of the OLS model. Ex ante we could not predict which firms that 
reported no capital leases in year t - 2 were going to report a positive amount 
in year t. To be consistent we would either have to exclude all firms that 
reported no capital leases in year t - 2 or else include all such firms. We opted 
for the latter strategy, to allow a more representative sample. Eq. (3) was 
reestimated on subsets of the Compustat sample obtained by deleting observa- 
i6Correcting for heteroskedasticity has opposite effects on y and 6. It increases (reduces) the 
standard error estimates and decreases (increases) the r-statistics for 6(y). The r-statistic on 6 is 
approximately - 17 without the White adjustment. 
“More correctly, as footnoted capital leases increase by x percent of LTC (say from 15 percent 
to 25 percent of LTC), unexpected declines in capital leases increase by 0.55x percent of A (from 
6.15 percent of A to 11.65 percent of A - using estimated values of y and 6 from table 1). These 
changes are not strictly comparable given the different deflators used. Reestimating eq. (3) with A 
as the deflator for the explanatory variable (instead of LTC) provides the following estimates: 
y = 0.014 and 6 = -0.47. Thus 53 percent of incremental capital leases were booked after SFAS 
No. 13. 
isCross-sectional dependence in error terms, because of industry concentration, is another 
potential violation of the standard assumptions of the OLS regression model (positive dependence 
biases downward the standard errors for parameter estimates). However, given the absence of 
sufficient time-series data, we are unable to estimate (and correct for) any bias due to this effect. 
E. Imhoff and J. Thomas, Lease disclosure consequences 289 
tions of types 1, 2, and 3 (both individually and collectively) and the results 
remained essentially unchanged.” 
We conducted several additional tests to determine if the table 1 results are 
sensitive to alternate specifications of the regression model and choice of 
proxy variables. Examination of scatter plots for alternate specifications of the 
dependent and independent variables over each period indicates that the eq. 
(3) model is well-specified both in terms of the variables selected as well as the 
linear relation assumed. Similarly, numerous attempts to reestimate eq. (3) 
using alternate variables revealed a consistent rejection of the null hypothesis.*’ 
Finally, alternative methods to adjust for heteroskedasticity provided similar 
results to those reported here using White’s procedure.*’ 
3.2. Limitations of Compustat sample results 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) suggest that levels of leasing are endogenously 
determined and correlated with other variables such as tax status, asset 
structure, contracting costs, and investment opportunities. Therefore changes 
in these variables, rather than SFAS No. 13, could have altered the costs and 
benefits of using capital leases, relative to other financing sources.** If so, the 
previous tests are biased due to the omitted correlated variables problem 
[Kmenta (1971, ch. lo)]. For example, we observe lessees with relatively large 
amounts of capital leases are concentrated in a few industries, such as airlines 
and retailers. Our results are consistent with the alternative explanation that 
an exogenous change that mainly affected these industries caused them to 
“The type 1 observations, consisting of firms that report no capital leases in both years, form 
the largest of the three groups. Removing type 1 observations that are concentrated at the origin 
increases the absolute value of estimates for y and 8 as well as the t-statistics on 6. 
*‘We used proportional changes in capital leases, both with and without scaling by total 
nonlease assets, instead of the change measure used in eq. (3). The heteroskedasticity increased 
significantly, since firms with very low amounts of capital leases report large proportional changes. 
Using proportional changes reduces sample size since all observations of types 1 and 3 (see table 
1, panel B) are deleted because the denominator (PVCAP,_,) is equal to zero. However, the effect 
of SFAS No. 13 is still significant, since 8 remains significantly less than zero (t-statistic = -4) 
when eq. (3) was reestimated using these alternative measures of firm response. We also replaced 
the scaling variable, nonleased assets (A), with other reasonable candidates such as total assets 
including capital leases and long-term capitalization. While the absolute value of the t-statistic on 
8 declined, because of the bias mentioned in footnote 10, in no case did it drop below 5. 
“Weighted least-squares regressions [Kmenta (1971, ch. S)] using linear functions of the 
independent variable eliminated most of the heteroskedasticity present. Although the estimated 
values of y and 6 differ from those reported in table 1, due to the weighting employed. the r-value 
on 6 always remains highly significant at approximately -6. 
22Endogeneity of the standard could explain why the new standard and the exogenous change 
that reduced the benefits of leasing occurred at the same time. Ball (1980) argues that the 
enactment of a rule change could signal that resistance to the change had declined and the 
standard was ‘allowed’ to pass. A decline in the attractiveness of capital leases due to a change in 
tax laws (for example) could be the reason why firms became less concerned about the effects of 
SFAS No. 13. 
290 E. Imhoff and J. Thomas, Lease disclosure consequences 
reduce capital leasing. In this case, eq. (3) is misspecified since the relevant 
explanatory variable, effect of the exogenous change (or its proxy, industry 
membership), is omitted and a spurious relation is observed with the amount 
of preadoption footnoted capital leases. 
While extant theory has identified variables that influence leasing behavior, 
a model that specifies how these variables determine levels of leasing is yet to 
be determined. One research design recommended in such cases is to use 
matching to control for these relevant explanatory variables [Runkel and 
McGrath (1972)]. Three variables that are correlated with the proportion of 
assets financed through capital leases, and are expected to proxy for the 
determinants of capital leasing, are: industry membership, total leverage 
(including capital leases), and firm size. 23 We selected a subsample of 79 pairs 
of firms with each pair consisting of a high-lease firm and a low-lease firm 
from the same industry with similar size and leverage. High and low levels of 
leasing are based on preadoption levels of footnoted capital leases. An eq. (3) 
regression estimated on this subsample is less likely to be confounded by 
omitted correlated variables, since by construction the sample correlation 
between the included independent variable and the three omitted variables is 
reduced, relative to the Compustat sample.24 
Matching procedures possess certain limitations in quasi-experiments where 
the researcher does not determine levels of control variables. If all variables 
relevant to the choice of capital leases have been identified, why do firms in 
the same industry with similar size and leverage choose different amounts of 
capital leases? Perhaps the optimal level of capital leases is not a uniquely 
determined amount; i.e., there is sufficient randomness in the choice of lease 
financing in the population to allow selection of a reasonable sample of high- 
and low-lease firms matched on the three control variables. Alternatively, our 
model is incomplete and matching only for industry, size, and leverage still 
leaves open the possibility of other omitted correlated variables. Despite these 
*$x the appendix for additional details on these control variables. The Compustat sample 
showed highly significant correlations (at less than one percent) between capital leases and these 
three variables, Certain industries, especially airlines and retailers, and highly levered firms 
employed more capital leases. Firm size had a more complex effect, since it was positively related 
to capital leases for certain industries and negatively related for others. 
24An alternative strategy is to reestimate the table 1 regression with the three control variables 
as additional explanatory variables. The coefficient for 6 remained significantly negative when 
1976 values of leverage and size and industry membership are included as regressors. Industry 
membership is represented by dummies for each of eight broad industry groupings with lessee 
firms [see Sharpe (1982) for industry definitions]. Also separate regressions were estimated for 
each industry group with leverage and size as additional regressors. Only in three industry groups 
(construction, energy, and utilities) was the estimate for 6 not significantly below zero, at the five 
percent level. Lessees in these three industries comprised only nine percent of the Compustat 
sample and consisted almost entirely of low-lease firms. Since the coefficients for size and leverage 
varied in sign and significance across industries, we conclude that complex interactions exist 
among the three control variables, and simply including them in an eq. (3) regression is likely to 
cause misspecification. 
E. Imhoff and J. Thomas, Lease disclosure consequences 291 
potential limitations, attempts to control for omitted correlated variables are 
not without benefits. If the null hypothesis is rejected again for the subsample, 
then the likelihood that SFAS No. 13 induced the results reported in table 1 is 
increased; if there is an omitted correlated variable, it is not one of these three. 
Alternatively, if the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, further investigation 
might identify the omitted variable(s) underlying the table 1 results. 
3.3. Changes in capital leases - Subsample results 
The appendix details the procedure employed to select the 79 matched pairs 
of high- and low-lease firms. For the subsample, the correlation between the 
three control variables and footnoted capital leases is reduced, relative to 
the Compustat sample. 25 Also using firm-specific adoption dates to delineate 
the transition period, instead’ of the uniform two-year period used for the 
Compustat sample, provides additional control against contemporaneous ef- 
fects. The number of firms with one-, two-, and three-year transition periods 
are 27, 120, and 11, respectively, and actual transition periods started as early 
as 1975 and extended as late as 1980. As in the Compustat sample, the 
preadoption and postadoption periods represent the two years immediately 
before and after the transition period. Individual years in the preadoption 
period are coded from - 3 to - 1 with year - 1 being the last preadoption 
year. Similarly, years in the postadoption period are coded from + 1 to + 3 
with year + 1 being the first postadoption year. 
Eq. (3) is adjusted to accommodate firm-specific transition periods as 
follows: 
r,= (PVCAP/A),- (PVCAP/A),_, 
= a + #qPF/CAP/A),_, (3’) 
+D{y+6(PvcAP,/L2-c)_,} +q, 
H,: 6=0, H,: 6x0. 
Here changes in capital leases are measured from year - 3 to - 1 in P, (two 
25Unlike size and industry membership, leverage is still significantly related (p-value below 
0.05) to footnoted capital leases for the 158-firm subsample. However, residual correlation 
between footnoted capital leases and the three control variables is unlikely to explain the 
subsample results (described later in section 3.3), since including all three control variables as 
additional explanatory variables does not affect the basic result (6 remains significantly less than 
zero). 
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years), from year - 1 to + 1 in P2 (one, two, or three years), and from year 
+ 1 to +3 in P3 (two years). 26 The expected impact of the standard (second 
right-hand-side variable) is now the value of PVCAPJLTC in the last 
firm-specific preadoption year, year - 1, and is activated by the dummy 
variable only if the observation relates to the transition period. 
The results of estimating eq. (3’) for the subsample, reported in panel A of 
table 2, are similar to the table 1 results observed for the Compustat sample. 
While the estimate for S changes from -0.55 (in table 1) to -0.46, unex- 
pected declines in capital leases during the transition period are still signifi- 
cantly related to preadoption levels of footnoted capital leases. Panel B of 
table 2 provides additional confirmation, by examining median changes in 
capital leases for high- and low-lease firms and median differences between 
changes for high- and low-lease firms in each matched pair over the transition 
and control periods. The overall comparison in the bottom row of panel B, 
based on a nonparametric signed rank test, significantly rejects the null 
hypothesis that matched pairs difference in the transition period equal those in 
the two control periods. This test is conceptually similar to the regression in 
eq. (3’) since matched pairs differences measure cross-sectional variation and 
interperiod comparisons measure unexpected changes. Given that the alternate 
hypothesis expects matched pairs differences to be more negative during the 
transition period, reported p-values are based on one-tailed tests. 
The median changes in capital leases reported in each cell of panel B 
provide a description of the magnitudes of these changes in each period. We 
report p-values for Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the null hypothesis that each 
median change equals zero to compare the relative magnitudes of changes 
across cells. The high-lease group reported median changes in capital leases, 
expressed as a percent of total nonlease assets, of - 0.9 percent, - 6.8 percent, 
and - 1.8 percent during P,, P2, and P3, respectively. For low-lease firms, the 
corresponding median declines are -0.4 percent, -0.9 percent, and -0.4 
percent, respectively. The matched pairs differences confirm these separate 
comparisons. Note that reporting changes as a percent of nonlease assets does 
not portray a representative picture of the substantial declines that occurred. 
For example, the 6.8 percent decline in capital leases (relative to nonlease 
assets) for the high-lease sample during P2 represents a 45-percent decline 
relative to preadoption levels of capital leases. 
26Relative to low-lease firms, high-lease firms are a smaller proportion (37 percent) of the 27 
firms with one-year transition periods and a larger proportion (64 percent) of the 11 firms with 
three-year transition periods. Therefore allowing for firm-specific transition periods could create 
an unintended bias in favor of the alternate hypothesis. However, no bias appears to exist, since 
the results reported in table 2 remain unchanged (actually, the null hypothesis is rejected even 
more strongly) when firm-specific preadoption and postadoption periods, of duration equal to 
each firm’s transition period, are employed. 
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Analysis of changes in capital leases around adoption of SFAS No. 13 for a subsample of 158 
firmsa 
Panel A : Regression analysis of changes in capiial leases 
r: = ( PVCAP/A), - (PvCAP/A),_, 
=a+/3(PVCAP/A),_2+D{y+G(PVCAP,/LTC)_,} +F, 
a P Y 
Estimate 0.010 - 0.16 0.012 
t-statisticb 2.71 - 4.26 1.61 
p-value’ 0.01 0.00 0.11 
n = 409 R2 = 0.57 
Y = two-year change in P VCA P/A 
P VCA P = present value of all future lease payments on all capital leases 
A = book value of all nonlease assets 
PVCAP, = present value of all future lease payments on capital leases reported in footnotes 
LTC = long-term capitalization = book value of long-term debt and equity plus PVCAP, 
D = 1 if t = 1 (transition period, Pz) and 





Panel B: Median changes in capital leases 
y (as%of A)=(PVCAP/A),xKH-(PVCAP/A),_,XlOO 
P, p2 p3 
Years - 3 to ~ 1” Years -1 to la Years 1 to 3” 
High-lease Median - 0.9% - 6.8% ~ 1.8% 
group ( p-value)c (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) 
Low-lease Median ~ 0.4% - 0.9% ~ 0.4% 
group (p-value)’ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Difference Median 0.2% ~ 5.9% -1.1% 
high-low ( p-value)c (0.65) (0.00) (0.03) 
Overall 
comparison ( p-value)d (0.00) 
“SFAS No. 13 was enacted in 1976, and most firms adopted the standard in 1978. Here 
firm-specific adoption periods are used and the years coded as follows: The year of (before) 
adoption is coded 1 (- 1) and the two years following year 1 (preceding year - 1) are coded 2 
(- 2) and 3 (- 3). respectively. Therefore changes in capital leases for all firms are measured over 
two-year preadoption (P,) and postadoption ( P3) periods. For the transition period ( P2), most 
firms (120 out of 158) have two years between years -1 and 1. For 27 (11) firms the transition 
period extended over one (three) years. 
bt-statistics have been computed based on White (1980) to correct for heteroskedastic error 
terms. 
‘In panel A, the p-value for S is based on a one-tailed test; all other p-values refer to two-tailed 
tests. In panel B, p-values refer to two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the null hypothesis 
th;t median changes in present values of capital leases = 0. 
p-value refers to a one-tailed rank sum test of the null hypothesis that matched pairs 
differences (high-low) in Pr equal differences in PI and P3, versus the alternative that differences 
in Pz are more negative than differences in PI and P3. 
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The nonparametric comparisons in panel B complement the regression 
analysis in panel A. 27 Our results are unlikely to be artifacts of the methodol- 
ogy selected, since we observe similar results using different methodologies. 
Similarities between the results reported in tables 1 and 2 suggest that the 
Compustat sample results are not due to an omitted variable and that our 
subsample seems to be representative of the Compustat sample. Since data 
required for additional tests had to be hand-collected from footnotes in annual 
reports, only the subsample is used for additional tests discussed below. 
3.4. Changes in operating leases - Subsample results 
The observed decline in reported capital leases after the standard suggests 
that offsetting increases in other sources of financing occurred at the same 
time. Since operating leases remained outside the purview of SFAS No. 13, 
firms could escape lease capitalization by restructuring capital leases to qualify 
as operating leases. An unexpected increase in operating leases in combination 
with the observed unexpected decrease in capital leases represents a substitu- 
tion from capital to operating leases. Fig. 1 indicates that only flows (mini- 
mum commitments for the next five years), not present values, are disclosed 
for operating leases, and in the preadoption period operating lease flows are 
reported in combination with flows for footnoted capital leases.*’ To obtain 
separate flows during the preadoption period, we assume that for each firm the 
relation between flows and present values for capital leases remains stationary 
over time. An average value of this relation, K,, is computed for each firm i 
using data from each year in the postadoption period (t = 1,2,3) as follows: 
K, = c (FLCAP,),, i (f’KN’,),,> 
t=l t=1 
where the variables are as defined in fig. 1. The present values of capital leases 
in the balance sheet and footnotes in each preadoption year (t = - 1, - 2, - 3) 
for each firm i are then multiplied by K, to obtain estimates of corresponding 
27Unlike nonparametric comparisons of medians, the regression analysis is sensitive to devia- 
tions from the linear relationship hypothesized and to violations of the assumptions of the OLS 
model. (Note that ignoring cross-sectional dependencies affects reported significance levels for 
both the regression analysis as well as the median comparisons.) Also, the matched pairs 
differences provide more control for omitted variables, since each pair is individually matched 
along all three control variables. On the other hand, the regression model uses variation along the 
independent variable more efficiently, since the nonparametric comparisons use only a high/low 
dichotomy. Finally, the regression model includes an expectation model that controls for mean 
reversion. 
“Rental commitments for the next year were also disclosed. These one-year-ahead Rows are 
highly correlated, by firm, with the five-year-ahead flows analyzed in the paper. The results in 
scctiona 3.4 and 3.5 remain essentially unchanged when one-year-ahead flows are analyzed. 
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values of flows: 
(FLCAP,) 1, = (PVCAP,) ,, x Ki 
and 
(FLCAP&,= (PVCAP,);,x K,. 
Flows for operating leases (FLOP) during each year in the preadoption period 
are determined by subtracting the imputed value of FLCAP, from the flows 
reported for operating and footnoted capital leases combined. 
A regression model similar to eq. (3’) is estimated on operating lease flows 
to determine if they increased unexpectedly (6 > 0) during the transition 
period. PVCAP/A in eq. (3’) is replaced by FLOP/A, while the second 
variable on the right-hand side, (PVCAP,/LTC)_,, remains unchanged. The 
results reported in table 3, panel A indicate significant unexpected increases in 
operating leases, suggesting substantial substitution from capital to operating 
leases. As in tables 1 and 2, the magnitude of 6 can be interpreted as a 
marginal increase in operating leases of approximately 37 percent.29 The 
overall comparison reported in the bottom row of panel B, based on rank sum 
tests, also significantly rejects the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.0). High-lease 
firms report a median increase in operating leases of 4.6 percent (as a percent 
of nonlease assets) during the transition period, which is significantly greater 
than zero. This increase is also significantly larger than the 1.1 percent increase 
registered by matched low-lease firms during the same period. Changes in 
operating leases are not significantly different from zero (at the five percent 
level) outside the transition period for either group. These results indicate that 
much of the unexpected decline in capital leases is offset by increases in 
operating leases, suggesting that many capital leases were restructured during 
the transition period to qualify as operating leases. 
3.5. Changes in overall leasing flows - Subsample results 
Can substitution into operating leases account entirely for the observed 
capital lease declines or did some substitution into nonlease financing also 
occur? Since the measures used for analyzing declines in capital leases (present 
values in table 2) and increases in operating leases (cash flows in table 3) are 
not comparable, we examine total leasing flows (FLTOT) to determine if the 
29Unlike tables 1 and 2, the estimate for y is now negative. Since definitional changes regarding 
discount rates only affect present values not flows, this sign reversal for the intercept suggests that 
the broader definition of capital leases after SFAS No. 13 resulted in some operating leases being 
reclassified as capital leases. Not accounting for this definitional change causes underestimation 
(overestimation) of postadoption levels of capital (operating) leases resulting in the positive 
(negative) intercept observed in tables 1 and 2 (table 3). 
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Table 3 
Analysis of changes in cash flows for operating leases around adoption of SFAS No. 13 for a 
subsample of 158 firms.a 
Panel A: Regression analysis of changes in operating lease flows 
Y,=(FLOP/A),-(FLOP/A),_,=a+P(FLOP/A),_z+D(y+G(PVCAP,/LTC)_,}+~, 
a P Y 6 
Estimate 0.017 - 0.26 - 0.015 0.37 
f-statisticb 4.14 -4.58 - 1.64 5.94 
p-value’ 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 
n = 369 R2 = 0.34 
Y = two-year change in FLOP/A 
FLOP = cash flow commitments for operating leases over next five years 
A = book value of all nonlease assets 
PVCA Pt = present value of all future lease payments on capital leases reported in footnotes 
LTC = long-term capitalization = book value of long-term debt and equity plus P VCA Pt 
D = 1 if t = 1 (transition period, P2) and 
= 0 if t = - 1 (preadoption period, P,) or if t = 3 (postadoption period, P,) 
Panel B: Median changes in operating lease cash flows 
r; (as % of A) = (FLOP/A), X 100 - ( FLOP/A),m2 X 100 
PI p2 s 
Years -3 to -la Years - 1 to la Years 1 to 3” 
High-lease Median 0.2% 4.6% -0.0% 
group ( p-value)c (0.20) (0.00) (0.77) 
Low-lease Median 0.2% 1.1% 0.0% 
group (p-value)’ (0.56) (0.00) (0.73) 
Difference Median 0.3% 3.1% 0.1% 
high-low (p-value)’ (0.56) (0.00) (l.OQ 
Overall 
comparison ( p-value)d (0.00) 
“SFAS No. 13 was enacted in 1976, and most firms adopted the standard in 1978. Here 
firm-specific adoption periods are used and the years coded as follows: The year of (before) 
adoption is coded 1 (- 1) and the two years following year 1 (preceding year - 1) are coded 2 and 
3 ( - 2 and - 3), respectively. Therefore changes in operating lease cash flows for all firms are 
measured over two-year preadoption (PI) and postadoption ( P3) periods. For the transition 
period ( P2), most firms (120 out of 158) have two years between years - 1 and 1. For 27 (11) firms 
the transition period extended over one (three) years. 
bt-statistics have been computed based on White (1980) to correct for heteroskedastic error 
terms. 
CIn panel A, the p-value for 6 is based on a one-tailed test; all other p-values refer to two-tailed 
tests. In panel B, p-values refer to two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the null hypothesis 
th;t the median changes in operating lease cash flows = 0. 
p-value refers to a one-tailed rank sum test of the null hypothesis that matched pairs 
differences (high-low) in P2 equal differences in PI and 5, versus the alternative that differences 
in P2 are more positive than differences in PI and P3. 
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two changes completely offset each other. If no unexpected changes in total 
leasing flows are observed, then increases in operating leases completely offset 
capital lease declines. If, however, total leasing flows decline unexpectedly, 
then a portion of the observed decrease in capital leases represents substitu- 
tion into nonlease sources of financing.30 
The results of estimating eq. (3’), adjusted to replace present values of 
capital leases by total leasing flows, are reported in panel A of table 4. Total 
leasing flows are obtained by combining flows for capital and operating leases 
(FLTOT = FLCAP + FLOP). While the estimate for 6 is negative, it is not 
significantly different from zero. Since y is also insignificantly different from 
zero, no significant decline in total leasing flows occurred during the transition 
period. In contrast, the panel B results indicate significant rejection of the null 
hypothesis (p-value on overall comparison is 0.01). During the transition 
period high-lease firms report a median decline in total lease flows of 1.6 
percent (as a percent of total nonlease assets), which is significantly less than 
zero. The smaller decline of 0.1 percent reported by low-lease firms (not 
significantly different from zero) results in differences between matched pairs 
that are also significantly different from zero. 
Inconsistencies between the two panels are explained by examining changes 
during the postadoption period reported in panel B. High-lease firms continue 
to reduce total leasing flows after adopting the standard, since the median 
decline of 1.3 percent in P3 is also significantly less than zero. This continued 
large decline during P3 is captured by the expectation model in panel A 
(significantly negative value of /3) leaving only a small and statistically 
insignificant unexpected decline during P2 to be explained by the level of 
footnoted capital leases. Estimating the expectation model over P, alone 
results in a significantly negative (at the five percent level) estimate for 13.~’ 
The absence of declines in operating leases during P3 (table 3, panel B) 
suggests that the continued decline in total leases during P3 is caused entirely 
by capital lease declines during this period.32 Perhaps, some capital leases 
3oA simple measure indicates that most, but not all, of the decline in capital leases during PI is 
offset by a corresponding increase in operating leases. The ratio of adoption period changes in 
operating lease flows (FLOP) to changes in capital lease flows (FLCA P) has a median value of 
- 0.69. This value is significantly lower than zero, which is the expected value if there was no 
relation between the two changes. However, it is also significantly different from - 1, which is the 
expected value if the two changes completely offset each other. 
“The coefficients obtained for a and B based on an eq. (2) regression estimated over PI alone 
were used to identify unexpected changes in total leasing during PI. Regressing these unexpected 
changes against preadoption levels of footnoted capital leases [eq. (l)] resulted in an estimate for 
6 = - 0.097 (p-value = 0.05). Note that any mean reversion effects are considered in the expecta- 
tion model estimated over PI. 
32Analysis of median changes in leasing flows for capital leases (FLCAP, not PVCAP as in 
table 2) indicates a - 1.2% decline, as a p&cent of nonlease assets, for high-lease firms during P3. 
Therefore, most of the P3 decline in total leasing flows of - 1.3% (table 4, panel B) for this group 
of firms is explained by capital lease declines. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of changes in cash flows for all leases around adoption of SFAS No. 13 for a subsample 
of 158 firmsa 






a P Y 6 
Estimate 0.017 - 0.13 - 0.0031 
[-statisticb 2.45 - 2.44 - 0.40 
p-value’ 0.01 0.01 0.69 
n = 388 R2 = 0.07 
Y = two-year change in FLTOT/A 
FLTOT = cash flow commitments for total leases (operating and capital) over next five years 
A = book value of all nonlease assets 
P VCA Pr = present value of all future lease payments on capital leases reported in footnotes 
LTC = long-term capitalization = book value of long-term debt and equity plus P VCAP, 
D = 1 if t = 1 (transition period, P2) and 









Panel B: Median changes in rotal leasing cash flows 
y (as % of A) = (FLTOT/A), X 100 - (FLTOT/A),_, x 100 
S p2 
Years - 3 to -la Years -1 to la 
Median - 0.2% - 1.6% 
(p-value)’ (0.58) (0.00) 
Median -0.6% -0.1% 
( p-value)c (0.05) (0.83) 
Median 0.7% - 1.5% 
( p-value)c (0.21) (0.00) 
( p-value)d (0.01) 
p3 







“SFAS No. 13 was enacted in 1976, and most firms adopted the standard in 1978. Here 
firm-specific adoption periods are used and the years coded as follows: The year of (before) 
adoption is coded 1 (- 1) and the two years following year 1 (preceding year - 1) are coded 2 
(-2) and 3 (-3), respectively. Therefore changes in total lease cash flows for all firms are 
measured over two-year preadoption (PI) and postadoption (P3) periods. For the transition 
period ( P2), most firms (120 out of 158) have two years between years - 1 and 1. For 27 (11) firms 
the transition period extended over one (three) years. 
bt-statistics have been computed based on White (1980) to correct for heteroskedastic error 
terms. 
‘In panel A, the p-value for 6 is based on a one-tailed test; all other p-values refer to two-tailed 
tests. In panel B, p-values refer to two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the null hypothesis 
th;t the median changes in total lease cash flows = 0. 
p-value refers to a one-tailed rank sum test of the null hypothesis that matched pairs 
differences (high-low) in P2 equal differences in PI and 5, versus the alternative that differences 
in P2 are more negative than differences in P1 and P3. 
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maturing soon after the transition period were not terminated or renegotiated 
as operating leases during the transition period, they were allowed to expire at 
maturity. 
To summarize, total leases declined during the transition period, relative to 
the pattern in the preadoption period, and this decline is larger for high-lease 
firms. Therefore, transition period declines in capital leases (table 2) are only 
partly offset by increases in operating leases (table 3) and the overall impor- 
tance of leasing (capital and operating combined) as a source of financing 
declined after SFAS No. 13. However, since high-lease firms continued to 
decrease total leasing even after adopting the standard, transition period 
declines were not unusual compared to the postadoption control period. 
Apparently the process of substitution into nonlease financing was gradual, 
and not completed within the transition period. 
3.6. Changes in equity and conventional debt - Subsample results 
Despite the firm responses documented in tables 2, 3, and 4, some high-lease 
firms did not report a decline in capital leases or in overall leasing. Such firms 
were either unaffected by the standard or were able to find alternative ways to 
mitigate any potential adverse consequences of capitalization (see section 4 for 
examples of other responses we observe). Abdel-khalik (1981) suggests that 
decreases in conventional debt and increases in equity may have been em- 
ployed to reverse the leverage-increasing effect of lease capitalization. He 
documents unexpected increases in equity issues during a three-year transition 
period (1975 to 1978) for a sample of high-lease firms, relative to equity issues 
during a three-year preadoption period (1972 to 1975). This finding motivates 
our last test which examines the null hypothesis that the mix of nonlease 
financing for lessees remained unaffected by the standard. The alternate 
hypothesis predicts that lessees undertook equity-increasing and debt-reducing 
changes to offset the leverage-increasing effects of the standard on their 
balance sheets. 
Changes in equity and debt are reexamined using our methodology, which 
includes a postadoption control period, and also tests for a cross-sectional 
relation between the magnitudes of unexpected debt and equity changes and 
levels of footnoted capital leases. Consistent with Abdel-khalik’s methodology, 
we use annual changes in debt and equity reported in the Statement of 
Changes in Financial Position (SCFP) and define net changes in equity and 
debt as issues less repurchases scaled by year-end book values of nonlease 
assets. Since lease capitalization is expected to affect contracts that are 
denominated in book values, these variables attempt to capture managerial 
efforts to alter the book values of equity and debt. With the exception of early 
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retirement of debt trading above or below face value, all amounts obtained 
from the SCFP represent book values.33 
The transition and control periods employed are defined as follows: 
Tl = preadoption period, employs changes reported in SCFP for 1973, 1974, 
and 1975, 
T2 = transition period, employs changes reported in SCFP for 1976, 1977, and 
1978, and 
T, = postadoption period, employs changes reported in SCFP for 1979, 1980, 
and 1981. 
Note that the three-year periods selected here are different from the two-year 
periods used in section 3.1 and the firm-specific transition periods used in 
sections 3.2 to 3.5. This specification maintains consistency with Abdel-khalik 
(1981) and reflects the fact that the transition period used here is more 
representative of the total period available for firms to respond to the new 
standard.34 
Attempts to estimate the regression in eq. (3’) to changes in equity and debt 
for the subsample uncovered no significant unexpected changes during the 
transition period. Further examination of the data reveals that, while there are 
some lessees with increases in equity and decreases in debt during the 
transition period, these changes are on average not large enough (as a percent 
of nonlease assets) to generate estimates of 6 that are significantly different 
from zero. As an alternative analysis, changes in debt and equity are investi- 
gated to determine if the frequency of extreme changes varied systematically 
over the three periods. 
To identify extreme changes in debt and equity we first computed annual 
debt and equity changes for all Compustat firms from 1973 to 1980. Distribu- 
tions of both changes, reported in table 5, seem fairly stationary, suggesting 
that Abdel-khalik’s results are probably not due to economy-wide effects. Next 
we coded all debt and equity changes for our 158-firm subsample to emphasize 
extreme changes, using the mean (over 1973 to 1980) 5th, lOth, 90th, and 95th 
percentile points indicated in the bottom rows of panels A and B in table 5. 
33Note that the equity change measure specifically excludes changes in the book value of equity 
due to retained earnings (net income less dividends). We concur with Abdel-khalik that including 
changes in retained earnings would reduce our ability to detect managerial efforts to change the 
book value of equity. In effect, this assumes that changes in realized net income, not including 
shifting of income between adjacent periods, is largely outside managerial control and that 
managers prefer not to change dividends as a vehicle to adjust the book value of owner’s equity. 
34As mentioned in footnote 8, lease capitalization was expected by lessees prior to enactment of 
the standard in 1976 and therefore some changes could have preceded the transition period 
considered here. Note that the availability of a slightly longer time series of SCFP data on debt 
and equity changes, relative to the lease data required for previous tests, allowed the three-year 
periods used in this subsection. 
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Table 5 
Issues and repurchases of equity and debt between 1973 and 1980 for all Compustat firms. 
Year 
Percentiles of distribution 
N 1% 5% 10% 50% 90% 95% 99% 
Panel A : Changes in paid-in-equity = ( Equity issues - Equity repurchases )/Total nonleased assets’ 
1973 1911 - 0.06 - 0.023 - 0.0120 0.000 0.0120 0.040 0.21 
1974 1947 - 0.06 - 0.014 - 0.0058 0.000 0.0060 0.020 0.11 
1975 1971 - 0.06 - 0.011 - 0.0040 0.000 0.0072 0.020 0.11 
1976 2015 - 0.07 - 0.013 - 0.0039 0.000 0.0110 0.030 0.14 
1977 2023 - 0.09 -0.019 - 0.0059 0.000 0.0086 0.020 0.13 
1978 2024 - 0.10 - 0.022 - 0.0062 0.000 0.0150 0.046 0.17 
1979 2013 - 0.10 - 0.024 - 0.0086 0.000 0.0186 0.060 0.22 
1980 1768 -0.11 - 0.019 - 0.0071 0.000 0.0360 0.100 0.25 
Mean - 0.08 -0.0174 - 0.0059 0.000 0.0146 0.042 0.16 
Panel B: Changes in debt = (Debt issues - Debt retirements)/Total nonleased assetsa 
1973 1905 -0.18 - 0.054 - 0.330 0.000 0.110 0.16 0.25 
1974 1940 -0.19 - 0.060 - 0.036 0.000 0.110 0.15 0.27 
1975 1964 - 0.25 - 0.094 - 0.058 - 0.001 0.084 0.12 0.25 
1976 2002 - 0.22 - 0.088 - 0.054 - 0.001 0.079 0.13 0.25 
1977 1999 - 0.20 - 0.074 - 0.037 0.000 0.099 0.16 0.30 
1978 2002 - 0.20 - 0.061 - 0.034 0.000 0.110 0.16 0.30 
1979 2001 - 0.27 - 0.067 - 0.037 0.000 0.110 0.16 0.29 
1980 1767 -0.19 - 0.080 - 0.043 0.000 0.110 0.16 0.29 
Mean - 0.22 - 0.075 - 0.043 0.000 0.100 0.15 0.28 
“The variables are obtained from Compustat as follows: Equity issues (Compustat data item 
#108), Equity repurchases (#115), Debt issues (# ill), Debt retirements (#114), Total nonleased 
assets (# 6 less # 84). 
Annual changes in debt and equity below the 5th and above the 95th 
percentile points are considered to be ‘very large’, and changes between the 
5th and 10th and between the 90th and 95th percentile points are considered 
‘large’ changes. Debt and equity changes for all firm-years are coded a value 
between -2 and +2 as follows: 
Code Change Description 
+2(-2) ‘ very large’ if change for that year is greater (less) than the mean 95th (5th) 
percentile point for all Compustat changes (see table 5) 
+1(-l) ‘ large’ if change for that year is greater (less) than the mean 90th (10th) 
percentile point for all Compustat changes (see table 5) 
0 ‘normal for all annual changes between the 10th and 90th percentiles 
All observed changes are adjusted for offsetting changes in adjacent years. 
This adjustment is often necessary for debt changes, since debt approaching 
maturity is typically refinanced. For example, if a firm reported a very large 
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decrease in debt (coded as - 2) in one year only to be followed by a very large 
increase in debt (coded as +2) of approximately the same magnitude in the 
next year, then both years’ debt changes are coded as ‘0’. The scores are then 
summed over each three-year period to get an overall coded value for that 
period. The few cases that had summed values for a period that were greater 
(less) than + 2 ( - 2) had the change codes set to + 2 ( - 2). 
Table 6 reports frequencies of the five coded values over all three periods. 
While most firms fall into the normal category (coded ‘0’) some report 
extreme changes. For example, the high-lease group in Tt (upper panel, first 
column) consists of 4,4, 65, 1, and 5 firms with equity changes coded - 2, - 1, 
0, + 1, and + 2, respectively. The bottom row in each panel presents p-values 
for Wilcoxon signed rank tests of the null hypothesis that the median change 
in each period equals zero. The high p-value (= 1) reported here indicates that 
extreme decreases of equity (four - 2’s and four - l’s) approximately equal 
extreme increases (one + 1 and five + 2’s) during T, for high-lease firms. 
Examination of debt and equity changes for the high-lease group during T2 
indicates more extreme equity increases (21) than decreases (11) and more 
extreme debt decreases (24) than increases (15). Note that both changes reduce 
balance sheet leverage and similar changes are not observed for Tl and T3. 
Unlike the leverage-reducing pattern observed for high-lease firms, both equity 
and debt changes for low-lease firms (reported in the middle panel) exhibit 
consistent patterns over all three periods. Equity changes reveal more extreme 
decreases than increases in T,, more increases than decreases in T3, and an 
intermediate response during T2. Debt changes reveal consistently more ex- 
treme increases than decreases for all three periods. Also, nonparametric rank 
sum tests (not reported) indicate that changes during T, for high-lease firms 
are significantly different from changes in Tl and T3 (p-values equal 0.05 and 
0.045 for equity and debt changes, respectively). For low-lease firms, however, 
changes in T, are not significantly different from those in Tl and T,. 
While the frequencies for extreme debt and equity changes for high- and 
low-lease firms are consistent with the alternate hypothesis, the overall com- 
parisons reported in the bottom row of the bottom panel are unable to reject 
(at the five percent level of significance) the null hypothesis that matched pairs 
differences in T2 equal differences in the two control periods. Further investi- 
gation using rank sum tests (not reported) reveals that matched pairs differ- 
ences (bottom panel) in T2 are significantly different from differences in T3 
(p-values equal 0.035 and 0.03 for equity and debt changes, respectively). 
However, since similar tests indicate that the matched pairs differences in T, 
are not significantly different from those in T,, for both equity and debt 
changes, the overall tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis at the five 
percent significance level. 
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Table 6 
Changes in equity and debt around adoption of SFAS No. 13 for a subsample of 158 firms 
Coded change 
value 
Equity changes” Debt changes” 
r, 7.2 r, ? r, r, 
1972-1975 1975-1978 1978-1981 1972-1975 1975-1978 1978-1981 
Panel A : High-lease group 
Very large 
decrease -2 4 7 11 10 11 7 
Large decrease - 1 4 4 3 3 13 5 
Normal 0 65 47 49 51 40 48 
Large increase 1 1 10 5 8 11 12 
Very large 
increase 2 5 11 10 7 4 5 
( p-value)b (1.00) (0.18) (0.92) (0.73) (0.07) (0.87) 
Panel B: Low-lease group 
Very large 
decrease -2 10 8 6 2 2 2 
Large decrease -1 4 5 5 1 4 6 
Normal 0 59 45 41 50 47 51 
Large increase 1 4 13 8 9 10 8 
Very large 
increase 2 2 8 17 17 16 11 
( p-value)b (0.03) (0.51) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Panel C: Di$erences between matched pairs offirms (high-low) 
Max. negative 
difference -4 1 0 0 3 3 2 
-3 2 1 1 3 6 2 
-2 2 12 18 13 12 9 
-1 3 9 9 9 15 11 
No difference 0 52 31 33 41 29 32 
1 8 15 8 6 10 16 
2 10 8 5 1 3 4 
3 0 1 1 3 1 0 
Max. positive 
difference 4 1 2 1 0 0 0 
( p-value)b (0.14) (0.87) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
Overall 
comparison 
(p-value)’ (0.25) (0.08) 
“Extreme equity changes reported are coded values between -2 and +2 based on annual 
changes in paid-in-capital (stock issuances less repurchases, deflated by nonleased assets) over 
each of the three periods. Similarly, extreme debt changes are coded values based on issuances less 
retirements of conventional (nonlease) debt, deflated by nonleased assets. Extreme increases 
(decreases) for both debt and equity are coded as + 1 and + 2 ( - 1 and - 2) if the changes are in 
the top (bottom) 90th and 95th percentiles, respectively, of changes reported by all Compustat 
firms. 
bp-vahtes, in parentheses, refer to two-tailed Wilcoxon sign rank tests of the null hypotheses that 
the median change is 0. 
‘p-values refer to one-tailed rank sum tests of the null hypothesis that matched pair differences 
(high-low) in T2 equal matched pair differences in T, and q, versus the alternative hypothesis 
that matched pairs differences for equity (debt) changes are more positive (negative) in T,. 
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In summary, the results support Abdel-khalik’s view that high-lease firms 
used leverage-reducing changes with nonlease sources of financing to reverse 
the balance sheet impact of the standard. Several tests comparing transition 
period changes separately with each control period and separate analyses of 
the two groups indicate that high-lease firms exhibit an unusual number of 
extreme debt decreases and equity increases during the transition period. 
However, the overall results reported here are only marginally significant for 
debt changes (p-value = 0.08) and not significant for equity changes (p-value 
= o.25).35 
4. Summary 
4.1. Methodology employed 
Often an ‘event study’ methodology, based on security prices, is used to 
measure economic effects of new standards.36 This approach is indirect 
because firm responses are hypothesized but not investigated. Instead, security 
price movements around the release date of new information relating to the 
standard are examined to observe economic consequences [Leftwich (1981)]. 
Some researchers have explored alternative methods, focusing on the direct 
link between accounting changes and firm responses. Typically, financial 
statement variables have been investigated to infer responses attributable to 
new accounting standards. 37 For example, the impact of SFAS No. 2, 
‘Accounting for Research and Development Costs’ [FASB (1974)], on reported 
R&D expenditures has been investigated in several studies [Dukes et al. 
(1980) Horwitz and Kolodny (1980), Elliott et al. (1984) Selto and Clouse 
(1985)]. 
Application of the direct approach to the lease standard requires considera- 
tion of several methodological problems noted by Ball (1980) and Wolfson 
(1980). Unlike earlier studies using the direct approach, we consider firm 
responses along many dimensions. The effect of other (unknown) contempora- 
neous changes is minimized by using control periods from before and after the 
transition period and by analyzing cross-sectional variation in firm responses. 
We also validate our results by using multiple analyses (regressions and 
35See the appendix for evidence of significant debt changes (and insignificant equity changes), 
based on overall comparisons for a subset of high- and low-lease firms. Also, note that the debt 
changes reported in table 6 are unlikely to be due to mean reversion. Since high-lease firms have 
less conventional debt than low-lease firms (see table 8) the presence of mean reversion woJld 
cause more debt increases for the high-lease group, in contrast with the debt decreases observed 
here. 
36For example, FASB pronouncements on oil and gas accounting, foreign currency translation, 
and changing prices have each been examined using the event study approach. 
“Other response variables that have been examined include auditor changes [DeAngelo (1982)] 
and lobbying behavior [Watts and Zimmerman (1978)]. 
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nonparametric matched pairs comparisons) on different samples (Compustat 
sample and subsample). After examining the data and obtaining an intuitive 
understanding of what changes occurred, we develop innovative ways to 
transform and analyze these data. While this study considers variables and 
relations that are specific to the lease standard examined, we believe many 
aspects of the methodology employed here are valuable for research studying 
the impact of other accounting standards. 
4.2. Results 
Overall our results support the hypothesis that the financial statement 
effects of lease capitalization required by SFAS No. 13 had a significant 
impact on lessees. Capital leases as a source of financing declined sharply after 
the standard. The substantial amount of substitution into operating leases we 
observe suggests that renegotiation of lease contracts is a low-cost alternative, 
relative to other responses that potentially mitigate the financial statement 
effects of the standard. To a lesser extent, other capital structure changes were 
also selected in some instances, evidenced by an increased use of nonlease 
financing and leverage-reducing changes in the mix of nonlease financing 
(decreasing in debt and increases in equity). Overall, most lessees apparently 
elected not to renegotiate contracts affected by lease capitalization nor to enter 
into technical default, and employed various capital structure changes instead. 
While the magnitudes of firm responses are on average related to the 
expected impact of the standard, individual firm responses show considerable 
variation. In addition to the firm responses analyzed here, we observed 
numerous other actions undertaken by firms to mitigate the effects of the 
standard, such as 1) successfully renegotiating contracts affected by complying 
with the standard [American Seating Company’s Annual Report for 19781, 
2) delaying capitalization to obtain additional time to renegotiate affected 
contracts [Pfeiffer (1980)], and 3) lobbying by trade groups to obtain special 
dispensation when applying the standard to leases that are unique to their 
industries [Barrons (11/12/1977, p. 5)]. What factors determine the choice 
among alternative responses ? Hopefully future research on cross-sectional 
variation in the mix of firm responses will provide further evidence on the 
relative costs of alternative responses. 
Appendix: Selection of subsample 
The subsample provides additional control to help interpret the results for 
the Compustat sample by attempting to reduce the bias caused by omitted 
correlated variables. Three omitted variables that could potentially explain 
firm responses and also be correlated with the included independent variable, 
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Table I 
Sample selection procedure. 
High-lease samplea 
Firms in 1980 edition of Compustat (Annual Industrial) tape 2,451 
Firms with footnoted capital leases (PVCAP,) reported from 1973 to 1976 388 
Firms with PVCAP,/LTC > 10% 269 
Matching procedures a 
Initial set of high lease firms 
Less firms excluded because no matches available due to: 
no low-lease control firms in 4-digit SIC industry groupb 
no matches on SIZE 
no matches on leverage (LEVR) 
Initial set of matched pairs 
Plus high-lease firms moved to low-lease group 








“Variables are obtained from Compustat as follows: PVCAP, (footnoted capital leases) = #88, 
LTC (long-term capitalization) = #88 + #9 + #lO + #60, SIZE (total assets) = #6 + #88, 
LEVR (leverage) = (#9 + #88)/(#9 + #88 + #lO + #60). 
bLow-lease firms were firms that disclosed any form of leasing during the period 1973 to 1976 
and had footnoted capital leases amounting to less than 10 percent of total long-term capitaliza- 
tion, except for the 12 relatively low-lease firms in the four industries with significant amounts of 
leasing (SIC #4511,5311,5411,5812) that had footnoted capital leases below 20 percent of LTC. 
PVCAP,/LTC, are: 
(1) industry (6digit SIC code), 
(2) total assets (including capital lease), SIZE, and 
(3) total leverage (including capital lease), LEVR. 
These variables are defined in table 7. Matching requires identification of pairs 
of high- and low-lease firms in the same industry that are reasonably matched 
along SIZE and LEVR. The 338 firms on Compustat reporting PVCAP, 
from 1973 to 1976 are examined to form a ‘high-lease’ sample. We identified a 
total of 269 firms with present values of footnoted capital leases (PVCAP,) in 
excess of 10 percent of total long-term capitalization (LTC) for 1976.38 Firms 
in this sample are expected to be most affected by lease capitalization since 
they report the highest amounts of footnoted capital leases. Matches for these 
269 high-lease firms are sought by identifying all low-lease firms (PI/CAP, < 
10% of LTC) in the same 4-digit SIC code that reported a positive amount of 
3”The total ‘long-term capitalization’ measure was used in ASR No. 147 [SEC(1973)]. Firms 
with footnoted capital (financing) leases in excess of five percent of this capitalization measure 
were required to disclose them in their footnotes. Interestingly, many firms below the five percent 
criterion also disclosed this information. 
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leasing activity, and then selecting one firm with reasonably similar size 
(represented by total assets plus PVCAP,) and leverage (long-term debt plus 
PVCAP divided by long-term capitalization) as of 1976. The size and leverage 
parameters used to obtain reasonable matches are: 
and 
SIZE : 39 0.40 < 
Size of high-lease firm 
Size of low-lease firm 
< 2.50, 
LEVR : 4o ILeverage of high-lease firm 
- Leverage of low-lease firm ( I 0.25, 
Note that these parameters are based on visual evaluation of sample firms 
and have no theoretical basis. They are the smallest ranges we could have 
selected to leave a reasonably large number of pairs of firms matched on 
industry, size, and leverage. Similarly, the 10 percent hurdle for high-lease 
firms is based on a tradeoff between larger sample sizes and potential misclas- 
sification of firms. The search for low-lease firms, matched on these three 
dimensions, was repeated for all 269 firms and resulted in a sample of 67 
matched pairs. In observing the firms that were dropped from the sample, we 
noted that four industries with significant amounts of leasing activity had been 
almost completely deleted (airlines, retail department stores, retail grocery 
stores, and fast food chains). These industries comprised the bulk of all lease 
firms examined in the FASB’s research report on leases [Abdel-khalik (1981)] 
and are considered important to this study. 
To include these industries in the study, we permit low-lease firms in these 
four industries to have a value of the explanatory variable, PVCAPJLTC, be 
as high as 20 percent, with their high lease counterparts reporting values in 
excess of 20 percent. This adjustment is in keeping with the relatively high-rel- 
atively low approach to matching and yet maintains a reasonably low proba- 
bility of misclassifying firms. 41 This adjustment allowed the addition of 12 
matched pairs, bringing the sample size to 158 companies (or 79 matched 
pairs). 42 Note that a 20 percent filter for high-lease industries and a 10 percent 
39This is a proportional parameter allowing the high-lease firm to be 40 percent as large as the 
low-lease firm (e.g., $40/$100) or the low-lease firm to be 40 percent as large as the high-lease firm 
(e.g., %100/$40). 
40The absolute difference in leverage is less than or equal to 0.25. 
41 For example, if the filter that determines high- and low-lease groups varied by industry, all 
industries could have been represented, yet a large number of firms would have been misclassified. 
‘Low’-lease firms with large amounts of leasing and ‘high’-lease firms with low levels of leasing 
would exist, thereby biasing downwards the probability of observing an effect in the matched pairs 
comparisons. 
42For the 12 pairs, the mean and median difference in financing leases (as a percent of 
long-term capitalization) is 20 percent, with differences between pairs ranging from 5 to 28 
percent. 
J.A.E.- B 
308 E. Imhoff and J. Thomas, Lease disclosure consequences 
Table 8 











PVCAP/LTC 0.2241 0.1823 0.0633 0.0563 
PVCAP,/LTC 0.2101 0.1607 0.0434 0.0 
LOG( SIZE) 5.1808 4.9471 5.2389 4.9698 
SALES 1212.16 208.21 1019.21 191.11 
LEVR 0.4535 0.4641 0.4147 0.4046 
DEBT RA TIO 0.3099 0.3202 0.3895 0.3932 
INTCOV 5.6414 3.9887 5.6645 4.2658 

















aThe variables are computed as defined below. All values refer to book values as reported by 
Compustat, except for Preferred equity where liquidation values are used. The Compustat data 
item numbers are in parentheses. PVCAP, = Footnoted capital leases (#88), PVCAP = Total 
capital leases (# 88 + # 84), LTC = Long-term capitalization = PVCAP, (# 88) + Long-term 
debt ( # 9) + Common equify (#60) + Preferred equity (# lo), SIZE = Total assets ( #6) + P VCAP, 
(#88) (in 1976), SALES = Net sales (#12) (in 1976), LEVR = (Long-term debt (#9) + PVCAP, 
(#88))/LTC (in 1976), DEBT RATIO = Long-term debt (#9)/( Long-term debt (#9) + Common 
equify (# 60) + Preferred equity (# 10)) (in 1976), INTCO V = Median value of interest coverage 
(between 1971 and 1980) defined as (Interest expense (#15) + Pre-tax income (#18 + 
#16))/lnterest expense (#15), RONA = Median value of Return on assets (between 1971 and 
1980) defined as Pretax income/SIZE. 
bSignificant at 5% level, based on two-tailed tests. 
filter for all other industries has no effect on the regression results in panels A 
of tables 2, 3, and 4. Also, it biases against finding a significant difference for 
the matched pairs comparisons reported in panels B of these tables.43 We do 
not believe that the matching requirements, which tend to delete many 
high-lease firms, bias our results in favor of the alternative hypotheses, since 
the subsample results in table 2 are similar to the Compustat sample results in 
table 1. The results in footnote 43 indicate that the matching requirements are 
likely to bias the subsample results against rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Table 7 summarizes the effect of each selection criterion on the original set 
of 388 high-lease firms, and table 8 provides summary statistics that compare 
the two groups. Consistent with the sample construction procedures, the 
high-lease group has significantly more footnoted capital leases (PT/cAP,) 
than the low-lease group. Also, high-lease firms have significantly more capital 
leases (PVCAP). Matched pairs are of similar size, based on natural loga- 
43To gauge the amount of bias, ah overall comparisons in panels B of tables 2, 3, and 4 and 
table 6 were repeated without these 12 additional pairs. As expected, the differences between high- 
and low-lease groups are even more significant for the reduced subsample of 67 pairs than they are 
for the 79 pairs. Note that the debt changes in table 6 become significant at the three percent level. 
(However, the equity changes remain insignificant at the five percent level.) 
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rithms of SIZE. Also, SALES, another measure of firm size is well-matched 
across the pairs of high- and low-lease firms. However, the total leverage 
(LE VR) match is not completely successful as high-lease firms report signifi- 
cantly higher values of LEVR (debt plus capital leases). Given that the 
high-lease group was constructed to have more footnoted capital leases and 
similar values of LEVR, the low-lease group should have higher amounts of 
conventional debt (DEBT RATIO). Table 8 confirms this expectation. [The 
interest coverage ratio (INTCOV), however, is not significantly different.] The 
low-lease group is significantly more profitable (RONA). Two other measures, 
not reported in table 8, are the number of years, between 1971 and 1980, that 
firms reported a tax loss carryforward and the number of years that the firm 
paid no dividends. While the high-lease group has a slightly lower number of 
firms that always paid some dividends (58 versus 63 out of the 79 pairs of 
firms) and also fewer firms that did not report a tax loss carryforward (43 
versus 49 out of 79 firms), the differences are not statistically significant using 
&i-squared tests of independence. To summarize, our subsample of pairs of 
high- and low-lease firms are similar along all relevant dimensions, except for 
leverage differences. 
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